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ASYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH ENVIRONMENTAL FEEDBACK
CHRISTOPH HAUERT, CAMILLE SAADE, AND ALEX MCAVOY
Abstract. Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous
environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of
patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only de-
termined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric
interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depend on an individual’s location. Interestingly, in
non-varying heterogeneous environments, the long-term dynamics are the same as for symmetric interactions
in an average, homogeneous environment. However, introducing environmental feedback between an individ-
ual’s strategy and the quality of its patch results in rich eco-evolutionary dynamics. Thus, individuals act as
ecosystem engineers. The nature of the feedback and the rate of ecological changes can relax or aggravate social
dilemmas and promote persistent periodic oscillations of strategy abundance and environmental quality.
1. Introduction
Most models in evolutionary game theory tacitly assume that games are symmetric, which means
that payoffs for individuals with distinct traits depend exclusively on their respective strategies and not
on other features such as physical properties including size, strength, speed, and access to resources.
Including any one of those aspects likely introduces at least small payoff differences, resulting in an
asymmetric game [1]. Since no two organisms are exactly alike in nature, such asymmetric interactions
are actually the norm and symmetric games represent a (useful) idealization. Asymmetries can arise
from genetic differences between individuals, from heterogeneity in environmental conditions, or from a
combination of the two.
Actually, asymmetric interactions have long been recognized as important in evolutionary game theory,
but they are usually addressed by considering interactions between two distinct populations [2, 3], or by
assigning different roles to individuals, for example occupant and contender in territorial conflicts [4–6].
In the first case, the source of asymmetries is based on differences between species and not attributed
to individual variation. Conversely, in the latter case, roles are typically assigned probabilistically, with
interactions restricted to individuals in different roles. This precludes correlations between strategies and
roles that would follow naturally from differences in individual features. Formally, this setup can be
captured by symmetric interactions among individuals with a larger set of strategies that is augmented by
the different roles [7].
Of course, even asymmetric games are often oversimplifications of reality. It is also notoriously difficult
to prove that reproductive fitness in nature can be explained in simple, game-theoretic terms [8–10]. But
these factors do not necessarily undermine the use of game theory in models. Indeed, in place of directly
modeling the intricacies of real populations, evolutionary games provide a synthetic environment in which
one can study the qualitative effects of some features arising in natural populations, such as conflicts of
interest and spatial heterogeneity. Given the traditional focus on symmetric games in these synthetic
models, it is especially relevant to understand how sensitive the dynamics are to heterogeneity in payoff
(fitness) accounting.
In the present work, we consider a natural source of asymmetry arising from heterogeneity in individual
environments. In particular, we study evolutionary games where each player inhabits a “patch,” which
can differ in quality and hence may account for location-dependent variation in reproductive fitness even
without explicitly considering spatial dimensions. Over time, the quality of these patches can change
through degradation or restoration, which introduces a temporal component to this spatial variation. As
a result, the model naturally constitutes an evolutionary game with environmental feedback.
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Including ecological components in evolutionary games has attracted increasing attention in recent
years [11–15]. Spatial and temporal heterogeneity has also been treated extensively in population genet-
ics, for example, when different alleles or traits are favored in different ecological niches [16, 17] or if
reproductive fitness depends on time [18, 19]. However, the population genetics literature has largely
focused on the frequency-independent case and hence excludes evolutionary games. Heterogeneity in
its different forms has long been recognized as a crucial part of evolution and frequency dependence
represents a potent promoter.
In studies that do consider asymmetric, frequency-dependent interactions, the environment is typically
considered to be fixed [20, 21]. A standard example is the asymmetric replicator equation, which has
been modified from its original form [22] to include asymmetric payoffs and multiple populations [23–26].
The replicator equation has also been extended to structured populations for both symmetric [27] and
asymmetric [28] matrix games.
In finite populations, asymmetric games are usually presented in the form of bi-matrix games, where
the fixation probability of a rare strategic type provides a measure of its evolutionary success [29, 30].
Bi-matrix games capture what some authors refer to as “truly asymmetric” games [31], which, for finitely
many individuals, could describe interactions between separate populations [32] or interactions along an
edge on an evolutionary graph.
We show here that, in addition to affecting the evolutionary dynamics, environmental feedback can
also introduce interesting ambiguities about the underlying nature of the strategic traits. For example,
when cooperators benefit both co-players and environment, this trait can be considered “cooperation” in
an absolute sense. However, when cooperators must exploit their environment in order to provide benefits
to co-players (such as through the extraction of valuable resources), this trait is only “cooperation” relative
to the co-player; to the environment, it better resembles defection. This ambiguity could be considered
a behavioural equivalent to pleiotropy in genetics – one behavioral strategy may simultaneously (and
differently) impact the co-players’ performance and the actor’s environment.
2. Environmentally-induced asymmetric games
In evolutionary models based on the replicator dynamics [24], all that matters is the relative fitness of
each strategic type compared to the others. In particular, whether fitness (or payoffs) are positive or neg-
ative has no meaning and no consequences on the dynamics. This property allows for some ambiguity in
the interpretation of payoffs and (relative) fitness, and frequently the two terms are used interchangeably.
On a more formal level, this ambiguity manifests itself in a convenient feature of the replicator equation,
namely that the dynamics remain unchanged when adding a constant to any column of the payoff matrix
[24].
In the frequency-dependent Moran process [33], conditions are more restrictive because fitness needs
to be translated into transition probabilities and hence cannot be negative. Negative payoffs are usually
resolved by mapping payoffs, pi, to fitness, f , with common mappings of the form f = exp (wpi) or
f = 1 + wpi, where w indicates the selection strength, i.e. the contribution of the game payoffs to the
overall fitness of individuals. If payoffs can be negative, the second form requires an upper limit on w to
ensure f > 0. The important limit of weak selection, w  1, ensures f > 0, and actually renders the two
payoff-to-fitness maps identical [34].
For mathematical convenience and tractability, most models in evolutionary game theory tacitly assume
that the population is either infinite or is of finite but constant size. In contrast, ecological models em-
phasize the dynamics of a species’ population size in a given environment or when competing with other
species. In this case, fitness can be interpreted as the difference between the rates (or probabilities) of
reproduction and death of individuals [35], which provides a viable interpretation for negative fitness; on
the other hand, both the reproduction rate and the death rate need to be non-negative in order to remain
biologically meaningful.
The purpose of this study is to incorporate ecological changes into evolutionary game theory by intro-
ducing feedback between an individual’s strategic type and its environment. Interestingly, even though
our model is based on the replicator dynamics, the interpretation of fitness requires more careful atten-
tion. Moreover, variable patch qualities introduce opportunities for ecosystem engineering [36, 37]. The
lifespan of environmental changes can be ephemeral, like nests of passerine birds, or enduring, like beaver
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dams. When compared to the generation time of the species, the environmental changes determine the
rate of eco-evolutionary feedback.
2.1. Symmetric evolutionary games. In the simplest formulation of an evolutionary game, individuals
interact in pairs and can adopt, through imitation or inheritance, one of two strategic types. We refer to
the two types as “cooperate” (C) and “defect” (D) because many interesting and relevant scenarios involve
the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas [38], i.e. in interactions that involve a conflict of interest
between individual and joint performances. The most stringent and best-studied social dilemma is the
prisoner’s dilemma [39] and its popular variant, the donation game [40].
In the donation game, a cooperator provides a benefit, b, to its partner at a cost to itself, c, where
0 < c < b. Defectors neither produce benefits nor incur costs. If both players cooperate, then both profit
and obtain b− c > 0; but both players are tempted to defect and avoid the costs. A defector meeting a
cooperator gets b, whereas the cooperator is left with the costs, −c. Thus, a player is better off defecting
regardless of what the opponent does; defection is the “dominant” strategy. However, if both players yield
to temptation, they each end up with nothing. The donation games satisfies equal-gains-from-switching
[41], and hence the difference in payoff to one player due to changing strategies is independent of the
partner’s strategy. This convenient property often significantly simplifies the analysis.
Another well-studied but less stringent social dilemma is the snowdrift game [42], which is motivated
by the anecdotal story of two drivers being trapped on either side of a snowdrift with the options to
either get out and start shoveling (cooperate) or to stay in the cozy warmth of the car (defect). If both
drivers shovel, each gets the benefit of getting home, b, and they split the cost of shoveling, 0 < c/2 < b.
The temptation to defect exists just as in the prisoner’s dilemma, but here the social dilemma is relaxed
because, when facing a defector, it is now better to do all the work and get b− c > 0 instead of nothing
(and wait for spring to melt the snowdrift). That is, defection is no longer dominant. We focus on these
two most prominent social dilemmas even though further and even weaker forms exist [43].
A generic interaction between two individuals and two strategic types, C and D, can be characterized
by a 2× 2 payoff matrix,
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
A C-type gets a payoff of R when interacting with another C and S when interacting with D. A D-
type gets T when interacting with C and P when interacting with another D. The characteristics of the
interaction are determined by the ranking of the payoffs. For example, the prisoner’s dilemma is defined
by T > R > P > S. Since T > R and P > S, the strategy D is dominant, and R > P creates the social
dilemma. When setting R = b− c, S = −c, T = b, and P = 0, we obtain the donation game. Similarly, the
snowdrift game satisfies T > R > S > P, with the common parametrization R = b− 12 c, S = b− c, T = b,
and P = 0 [44]. Note that for c > b, the snowdrift game effectively reverts to a prisoner’s dilemma and
defection is again the dominant strategy.
In well-mixed populations, every individual is equally likely to interact with anyone else. For a fraction,
x, of type C individuals (and 1− x of type D), the expected payoff of cooperators and defectors is fC =
xR + (1− x) S and fD = xT + (1− x) P, respectively. The replicator dynamics states that the type with
the higher fitness increases in frequency:
x˙ = x (1− x) ( fC − fD) . (2)
The dynamics admit up to three equilibria: two trivial ones at P0 = 0 and P1 = 1, and possibly a third
equilibrium at Q = (P− S) / (R− S− T + P), provided that Q ∈ (0, 1). The stability of each equilibrium
is easily determined by checking whether a rare type can invade. The stability criterion reduces to P > S
for P0 and to R > T for P1. The equilibrium Q exists if both trivial equilibria are either stable or unstable,
and, in the latter case, Q is stable.
For the donation game, the equal-gains-from-switching property (additivity) reduces the replicator
dynamics to x˙ = x (1− x) (−c) < 0. It follows that the fraction of cooperators is always dwindling, and P0
is the only stable equilibrium. In contrast, for the snowdrift game, we obtain a stable interior equilibrium
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at Q = (b− c) / (b− c/2), which means that cooperators and defectors can coexist as a consequence of
the relaxed social dilemma.
2.2. Asymmetric evolutionary games. Asymmetric interactions can arise if individuals have differential
access to environmental resources. More specifically, we consider a population where each individual
resides on its own patch. Patches can be rich or poor in quality.
2.2.1. Additive environmental benefits. Rich patches confer an environmental benefit, e, to its occupant,
whereas poor patches confer nothing. Naturally, this heterogeneity in patch quality results in asymmetric
interactions that are captured by the extended, generic payoff matrix,
( Cp Dp
Cr R + e, R S + e, T
Dr T + e, S P + e, P
)
, (3)
where Ci, Di with i ∈ {r, p} refer to the strategic types on patches of quality i. The first entry in each
cell of the matrix indicates the payoffs to the row player (on a rich patch), while the second entry denotes
the payoffs to the column player (on a poor patch). For interactions between individuals on patches of
identical quality, the payoff matrix remains symmetric and equal to
( Cr Dr
Cr R + e S + e
Dr T + e P + e
)
; (both patches rich) (4a)
(Cp Dp
Cp R S
Dp T P
)
. (both patches poor) (4b)
The environmental benefit corresponds to an increase in the background fitness of its occupant.
The asymmetry of interactions results in four types: cooperators and defectors on good and bad
patches, respectively. Thus, the state of the population, x, is determined by four dynamical variables:
x = (xr, xp, yr, yp) where xi refers to the frequency of cooperators and yi to that of defectors on rich and
poor patches, respectively. Formally, instead of dealing with asymmetric interactions of two strategies in
two environments, the payoffs for the four competing types can be represented by a symmetric 4× 4 pay-
off matrix A =
[
aij
]
where aij denotes the payoff of an individual of type i against one of type j with
i, j ∈ {Cr, Cp, Dr, Dp}. The average payoff for each type is then given by a vector, ß = A · x. That is, pi1
and pi2 (resp. pi3 and pi4) represent the payoffs to cooperators (resp. defectors) on rich and poor patches,
respectively.
The dynamics of the four types are then governed by the system of equations,
x˙r = fCyr − fDxr; (5a)
x˙p = fCyp − fDxp; (5b)
y˙r = fDxr − fCyr; (5c)
y˙p = fDxp − fCyp, (5d)
where fC and fD denote the average fitness of cooperators and defectors, respectively. The terms fixj
(or fiyj) indicate the (average) rates at which individuals of type i produce offspring weighted by the
probability that it replaces a cooperator (defector) on a patch of type j. For example, the frequency of
xr increases whenever C reproduces (which happens at a rate fC) and its offspring replaces a defector on
a rich patch (which occurs with probability yr) but decreases if D reproduces (at rate fD) and replaces a
cooperator on a rich patch (with probability xr).
Naturally, the sum of the frequencies of all four types must remain normalized and add up to one, xr +
xp + yr + yp = 1. The frequency of cooperators is x = xr + xp and the proportion of rich patches remains
constant, xr + yr = α for some fixed α because patch qualities do not change. In the absence of correlations
between strategies and patches, we have xr = xα, xp = x (1− α), yr = (1− x) α, yp = (1− x) (1− α), and
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it follows that x alone still captures the full dynamics. In fact, even if initial configurations are chosen
with strong correlations between strategies and patches, these correlations are eventually eliminated by
the dynamics (see Appendix A).
This interpretation of Eq. (5) implies that fitness must be non-negative, fC, fD > 0, because they repre-
sent rates of reproduction. Conversely, the average payoffs pii may be negative for some aij, for example
in (i) the donation game or (ii) the snowdrift game in case costs exceed benefits (which essentially turns
the interaction into a prisoner’s dilemma). Fortunately, negative payoffs can be easily resolved by ap-
propriately mapping payoffs to fitness. More specifically, we introduce a constant background fitness,
σ > −mini,j aij, so that the rates of reproduction averaged across patches for cooperators and defectors,
respectively, are
fC = x (σ+ αpi1 + (1− α)pi2) ; (6a)
fD = (1− x) (σ+ αpi3 + (1− α)pi4) . (6b)
Interestingly, the fixed points of the dynamics defined by Eq. (5) and the asymmetric payoffs Eqs. (3)-(4a)
are the same as those of the replicator equation with the symmetric 2× 2 payoff matrix
( C D
C R + αe S + αe
D T + αe P + αe
)
, (7)
which, notably, turns out to be independent of σ (for details see Appendix A). Moreover, since the repli-
cator dynamics are invariant under adding a constant to any (or all) columns of the payoff matrix, the
replicator dynamics for matrix (7) are actually identical to those of matrix (1), see Fig. 1. The results can be
verified and the dynamics further explored through interactive online tutorials [45]. Thus, in this scenario,
environmental asymmetries may introduce only small and fleeting differences in the transient dynamics
while leaving the long-term results unchanged.
2.2.2. Asymmetric costs and benefits. Naturally, many kinds of environmentally-induced asymmetries exist.
Another kind of asymmetry is easily motivated in the donation game where costs incurred and benefits
provided depend on the patch quality. More specifically, cooperators on rich patches provide benefits, br,
at a cost, cr < br, whereas on poor patches the benefit is bp and the cost is cp < bp. Defectors neither
provide benefits nor incur costs. The corresponding payoff matrix is
A =

Cr Cp Dr Dp
Cr br − cr bp − cr −cr −cr
Cp br − cp bp − cp −cp −cp
Dr br bp 0 0
Dp br bp 0 0
. (8)
For cp > 0 > cr this setup mimics an intriguing situation where cooperators exploit rich patches and
provide benefits to their interaction partners at no cost, or more precisely, even at a personal gain of −cr.
The average rates of reproduction for cooperators and defectors in the absence of correlations between
strategies and patches amounts to
fC =x
(
xb¯− c¯) ; (9a)
fD = (1− x) xc¯, (9b)
where b¯ = αbr + (1− α)bp and c¯ = αcr + (1− α)cp denote the benefits and costs averaged across patch
types. Thus, the change in cooperator frequencies is independent of br, bp and an increase requires c¯ <
0, which effectively turns the donation game into a harmony game. However, this can only hold if
cooperators exploit rich patches, cr < 0, and those patches are sufficiently abundant.
Similarly, asymmetries in the snowdrift game arise when drivers encounter a snowdrift on a steep
mountain road. While the benefit, b, remains unaffected and, for simplicity, is assumed to be the same for
both individuals, the costs for clearing the snow are smaller for the individual on the mountain side, cm,
than on the valley side, cv. These cost differences could be caused, for example, by gravity, which reduces
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Figure 1. Asymmetric donation game. Evolutionary trajectory of the frequency of cooperators (x = xr + xp,
solid blue line), the frequency of cooperators on rich patches (xr, long-dashed green line), and the covariance (or
linkage) between cooperators and rich patches (ν = xr − (xr + xp)(xr + yr), short-dashed red line) in asymmetric
donation games with b = 4, c = 1, and 50% rich patches (α = xr + yr = 0.5) that provide environmental benefits
e = 2 to their occupant. The dynamics readily eliminates any covariance introduced by initial configurations and
cooperators invariably dwindle and eventually disappear: a positive covariance for an initial configuration with
50% cooperators and 50% defectors, with all cooperators on rich patches and all defectors on poor patches; b
negative covariance with all cooperators on poor patches and all defectors on rich patches; c initial configuration
without linkage: cooperators and defectors each split equally between rich and poor patches; d frequency of
cooperators in the symmetric, averaged donation game in the absence of environmental benefits.
the effort needed to clear the snow. However, we note that the interpretation is not especially important
here because the snowdrift game is not intended to model actual drivers on a mountain road; rather, this
game simply captures important qualitative features of a relaxed social dilemma [44], and we focus on
cost heterogeneity to understand how asymmetry affects the evolutionary dynamics of this well-studied
social dilemma.
With heterogeneity in costs, it is no longer obvious how to split the cost of clearing a snowdrift among
a pair of cooperators. Two natural approaches are that either (i) each clears half of the snowdrift at costs
of cm/2 and cv/2, respectively, resulting in the payoff matrix
( Cv Dv
Cm b− cm2 , b− cv2 b− cm, b
Dm b, b− cv 0, 0
)
, (10)
or (ii) each pays the same effective cost, which results in a fair split, giving the payoff matrix
( Cv Dv
Cm b− c˜, b− c˜ b− cm, b
Dm b, b− cv 0, 0
)
, (11)
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Figure 2. Asymmetric snowdrift game. Evolutionary trajectories of the frequency of cooperators (x = xr + xp,
solid blue line), the frequency of cooperators on rich patches (xr, long-dashed green line), and the covariance (or
linkage) between cooperators and rich patches (ν = xr − (xr + xp)(xr + yr), short-dashed red line) in asymmetric
snowdrift games with equal benefits, b = 4, but low costs on rich patches (on the mountain side), cm = 1, and
high costs on poor patches (on the valley side), cv = 6. Since cv > b, the snowdrift game effectively turns into a
prisoner’s dilemma for players on the valley side. In order to prevent negative reproduction rates, the background
fitness is set to σ = 2. The evolutionary outcome depends on the fraction of the population, α, residing on
rich, mountain-side patches. a with sufficiently many rich patches, α = 0.6, the population, on average, is
engaging in a symmetric snowdrift game with c = αcm + (1− α)cv = 3, which results in an equilibrium fraction of
cooperators of x∗ = 0.4 with x∗α = 6/25 on rich patches. The initial configuration exhibits strong linkage with
60% cooperators, all on rich patches, which results in transient differences from the frequency of cooperators
obtained for the averaged game (blue, dash-dotted line). b with fewer rich patches, α = 0.1, the population, on
average, is essentially trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma because b < c = 5. Consequently, the favourable conditions
on rich patches remain insufficient to rescue cooperation from extinction.
where c˜ = cmcv/ (cm + cv) [46]. We note that costs can be split in other ways [28] but these two cases
represent particularly interesting and relevant scenarios to derive asymmetric variants of the classical
snowdrift game. Naturally, snowdrifts can also arise at peaks and troughs, in which case players on both
sides experience the same costs. These interactions follow a symmetric matrix,
( Ci Di
Ci b− ci2 b− ci
Di b 0
)
, (12)
where i ∈ {m, v}. As before, large costs (ci > b) can result in negative payoffs, but including a background
fitness, σ, with σ > cv prevents negative reproduction rates. This background fitness, σ, does not affect
the population dynamics (see Appendix A).
For equal (as opposed to fair) cost divisions, Eq. (10), the dynamics in the long run are governed by the
symmetric payoff matrix
( C D
C b− c2 b− c
D b 0
)
, (13)
where c = αcm + (1− α) cv denotes the weighted average of costs across patches, assuming that a fraction
α (= xr + yr) lie on the mountain side. In contrast to the interactions in Eq. (7), the proportion of rich and
poor patches now does affect the population dynamics and can even change the characteristic features of
the interaction from the perspective of the population. For example, if cm < b but cv > b then individuals
on the mountain side interact in a snowdrift game whereas those on the valley side face a prisoner’s
dilemma. Depending on the abundance of rich, mountain-side patches, the population as a whole might
be trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma, and cooperators would ultimately disappear. However, when rich
patches are sufficiently abundant, cooperators are able to coexist with defectors (see Fig. 2).
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Figure 3. Fair versus equal splits of the costs in the asymmetric snowdrift game, Eq. (13) versus Eq. (14).
The difference in equilibrium fractions of cooperators for the two scenarios, ∆xeq = x∗fair − x∗equal, is shown as a
function of the fraction of rich, mountain sites, α. a The benefit is b = 4 and the costs are fairly similar, cm = 1,
cv = 2. For α < 2/3 fair splits of the costs increase cooperation, whereas for α > 2/3 equal splits result in more
cooperation. b For larger differences in the costs, cm = 0.2, cv = 3.8, the effect of fair splits is more pronounced
with up to 50% more cooperators. Interestingly, the effect is strongest at an intermediate value, αmax ≈ 0.084.
Only for α > 0.95 do fair splits have a slightly detrimental impact on cooperation.
Similarly, for fair (but not necessarily equal) cost divisions, Eq. (11), the long-term dynamics are gov-
erned by the symmetric matrix
( C D
C b− c˜ b− c
D b 0
)
. (14)
Notably, only the payoff of cooperators against defectors depends on the fraction of rich sites, α (through
c). Interestingly, fair splits of the work do not necessarily support cooperators (see Fig. 3). More precisely,
if b > cv > cm, i.e. all interactions are true snowdrift games, then fair splits of the work indeed promote
cooperation, provided that
α <
cv
cv + cm
. (15)
Otherwise, equal splits of the work result in larger fractions of cooperators at equilibrium. In fact, the scale
tips in favor of fairness if the expected costs of cooperation are higher in the valley than on the mountain,
cv(1− α) > αcm. For α < 0.5, i.e. if less than half the population resides on rich, mountain-side sites, fair
splits always results in increased cooperation. Only for sufficiently large α is it the case that fair splits no
longer provide an advantage to cooperators.
3. Environmental feedback – the conservation game
In the above analysis, individuals interact with each other, but they do not change their environment.
As a result, the fraction of rich and poor patches remains constant. Let us now turn to the other extreme,
where individuals interact exclusively with their environment. As before, a rich patch provides a benefit,
e, to the occupant, whereas a poor patch provides nothing. However, cooperators now tend to their patch
at a cost, c, which maintains the quality of rich patches and restores poor patches at a fixed rate, λ.
Conversely, defectors exploit their patches so that poor patches are unable to recover, and rich patches
deteriorate and turn into poor ones at rate λρ. With this parametrization, ρ indicates how much faster (or
slower) patch degradation occurs as compared to restoration, while the common factor λ determines the
timescales between evolutionary and ecological processes: for large λ (relative to the benefit, e, and the
cost, c) ecological processes happen faster than evolutionary changes (and vice versa for small λ). Thus,
cooperators and defectors engage in a game of environmental conservation.
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The state of the population is again captured by x = (xr, xp, yr, yp) where xi (yi) denote the frequency
of cooperators (defectors) on rich and poor patches. The dynamics are defined by
x˙r = fCyr − fDxr + λxp; (16a)
x˙p = fCyp − fDxp − λxp; (16b)
y˙r = fDxr − fCyr − λρyr; (16c)
y˙p = fDxp − fCyp + λρyr. (16d)
For λ = 0, these equations reduce to the previous dynamics, Eq. (5), without environmental feedback and
with constant patch qualities. The fitness or, more precisely, the reproductive outputs of cooperators and
defectors, respectively, averaged across patch types are
fC = x (σ− c) + xre; (17a)
fD = (1− x) σ+ yre, (17b)
where x = xr + xp and σ again denotes a background fitness with σ > c to ensure non-negative rates of
reproduction. The constraint xr + xp + yr + yp = 1 must still hold, but, in contrast to Eq. (5), no other
simplifications are possible, which results in three independent dynamical variables.
A different but more intuitive and illustrative set of dynamical variables is given by x = xr + xp, which
tracks evolutionary changes in the frequency of cooperators; α = xr + yr, which tracks ecological changes
in the abundance of rich patches; and the covariance between cooperators and rich patches, ν = xr − xα,
which indicates the linkage beyond random assignments of individuals to patches (see Appendix B). The
corresponding dynamical equations of the conservation game are
x˙ = (1− x) x (−c) + νe; (18a)
α˙ = λ (x (1+ α (ρ− 1)) + ν (ρ− 1)− αρ) ; (18b)
ν˙ = x ((1− x) λ (1+ α (ρ− 1)) + ν (c− λ (ρ− 1)))− ν (eα+ σ+ λ) . (18c)
The dynamics admit up to three fixed points of the form (xˆ, αˆ, νˆ). Two trivial fixed points, P0 = (0, 0, 0)
and P1 = (1, 1, 0), always exist and represent homogeneous states with all defectors on poor patches (P0)
and all cooperators on rich patches (P1), respectively. If it exists, the third, interior equilibrium Q satisfies
xˆ =
ρ
c
λ(e− c)− cσ
e− c− (ρ− 1)σ ; (19a)
αˆ =
xˆ + (ρ− 1)νˆ
ρ− (ρ− 1)xˆ ; (19b)
νˆ =
c
e
xˆ(1− xˆ), (19c)
which indicates a mixture of cooperators and defectors on rich and poor patches. Clearly, smaller mainte-
nance costs, c, and larger environmental benefits, e, both support cooperation, i.e. increase xˆ; see Eq. (19).
Moreover, cooperation is supported by faster ecological changes (increasing λ) and faster degradation of
rich patches by defectors (increasing ρ).
Stability analysis shows that the trivial equilibrium P0 is a stable node if (e− c) λ < cσ (see Appen-
dix C). Consequently, for sufficiently large environmental benefits, e, sufficiently small maintenance costs,
c, or sufficiently fast ecological changes, λ > λc = cσ/ (e− c), the defector equilibrium turns into an unsta-
ble node (but never an unstable focus) and cooperators can persist. Conversely, the cooperator equilibrium
P1 is a stable node if the combined ecological effects exceed a threshold, λρ > c (e− c + σ) / (e− c). There-
fore, the homogeneous state consisting of only cooperators is always stable for sufficiently small costs, c,
or sufficiently fast ecological changes. Note that P1 might be a focus, but in this case, it is stable only in the
unfortunate situation where patches require maintenance costs that exceed their environmental benefit,
c > e (see Appendix C).
Unfortunately, the stability analysis of the interior equilibrium involves unwieldy solutions to cubic
polynomials and hence remains inaccessible in closed form. Nevertheless, some inferences can be made
based on the stability of P0 and P1. If both homogeneous equilibria are unstable, we can expect Q to exist
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and be either stable (node or focus) or unstable (focus). In the latter case, the dynamics should undergo a
Hopf bifurcation and exhibit a stable limit cycle.
3.1. Ecological changes. The rate of ecological changes as compared to evolutionary changes is controlled
by the parameter λ, whereas the kind of ecological changes depends on the rate of degradation as com-
pared to restoration, ρ. In order to highlight the effects of ecological changes, we consider the special
case of equal degradation and restoration rates, ρ = 1. In this case, the analysis becomes simpler and,
in particular, the interior fixed point is now given by Q = (xˆ, xˆ, (1− xˆ) xˆc/e) with xˆ = λ/c− σ/ (e− c).
Interestingly, at Q, cooperators and rich patches have the same frequency, which tends to increase for
lower maintenance costs, c, smaller environmental benefits, e, or faster ecological changes, λ, as shown
in Fig. 4. Stable (limit) cycles cannot occur based on the analysis of the characteristic polynomial, which
shows that a Hopf bifurcation is impossible for e > c; see C.2.
3.2. Restoration versus degradation. Faster ecological changes (larger λ) support cooperation by increas-
ing the covariance or linkage between cooperators and rich patches, ν. Similarly, increasing the rate at
which defectors degrade rich patches relative to cooperators restoring poor ones (larger ρ) also increases
ν by increasing the covariance between defectors and poor patches. For ρ > 1, restoration of poor patches
is faster than degradation of rich patches (and vice versa for ρ < 1). More specifically, under conditions
where cooperators disappear, as in Fig. 4a, increases in ρ result in bistable dynamics, where both P0 and P1
are stable (Q is unstable) and have their respective basins of attraction such that the evolutionary outcome
depends on the initial configuration; see Fig. 5a. For sufficiently large initial fractions of cooperators, rich
patches, and/or linkage between the two, cooperation can thrive and eventually take over the population.
Conversely, under conditions where cooperators prevail, as in Fig. 4c, lowering ρ reduces the linkage be-
tween defectors and poor patches such that cooperators are no longer able to take over. Instead, both P0
and P1 are unstable, and a stable interior fixed point Q appears where cooperators and defectors coexist
(Fig. 5b). The conservation game can be explored interactively [45] and a summary of the qualitative
dynamics as a function of the ecological parameters, λ and ρ is shown in Fig. 6a.
4. Games & ecology
So far, our discussion has been limited to two extreme cases: (i) individuals interact with each other
but not with their environment or (ii) individuals interact with their environment but not each other. In
the following, we now turn to the general eco-evolutionary dynamics, which combines the two types of
interactions to obtain asymmetric evolutionary games in a changing environment.
4.1. Eco-evolutionary dynamics. The dynamics follow Eq. (16), but the rates of reproduction now include
payoffs from interactions with other members of the population; see Eq. (6). Therefore, in addition to
engaging in social interactions, cooperators also restore poor patches, while defectors not only attempt to
take advantage of others but also exploit and degrade the environment.
The generic dynamics in terms of the fraction of cooperators, x, fraction of good patches, α, and the
covariance between the two, ν, are derived in Appendix B. Again, the two trivial fixed points, P0 and P1,
always exist and correspond to the homogeneous states of defectors on poor patches and cooperators on
rich patches, respectively. Unfortunately, however, the generic case cannot be analyzed in closed form for
the same reasons as before and hence we present the effects of ecological feedback on the evolutionary
outcomes through representative numerical investigations of the characteristic dynamics (see Fig. 6 for a
summary and Hauert [45] for interactive tutorials). Nevertheless, three important and illustrative special
cases permit a more detailed analysis: (i) additive environmental benefits, (ii) equal-gains-from-switching
(donation game), and, additionally, (iii) identical restoration and degradation rates.
First, for additive environmental benefits, the rates of reproduction are given by Eq. (A7), and the fixed
points of the dynamics are
αˆ =
νˆ (ρ− 1) + xˆ
ρ− (ρ− 1) xˆ ; (20a)
νˆ =
1
e
xˆ (1− xˆ) (P− S− xˆ (R− S− T + P)) , (20b)
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Figure 4. Effects of ecological versus evolutionary changes in the conservation game, where rich patches
provide an environmental benefit, e = 3, cooperators pay costs, c = 1, to maintain rich patches or to restore
poor ones, and the background fitness, σ = 1, prevents negative rates of reproduction. For equal degradation
and restoration rates, ρ = 1, the long-term behaviour is determined by the ecological timescale, λ. Panels a-c
illustrate the increase in cooperation (solid blue line), rich patches (long-dashed green line) and the covariance
between the two (short-dashed red line) for increasing rates of ecological changes, larger λ. a for slower changes
(λ = 0.4), the environment deteriorates and defection dominates. b for intermediate rates (λ = 1), cooperators
and defectors coexist regardless of the initial configuration (the solid/dashed and dash-dotted lines give initial
cooperator fractions of x0 = 0.8 and x0 = 0.1, respectively). c for faster changes (λ = 2), cooperators efficiently
generate rich patches and readily take over.
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Figure 5. Effects of degradation versus restoration in conservation games on the frequency of cooperation
(solid blue line), rich patches (long-dashed green line), and the covariance between the two (short-dashed red
line). Game parameters are e = 3, c = 1, and σ = 1, as in Fig. 4. a for slow ecological changes (λ = 0.4,
c.f. Fig. 4a), high degradation rates (ρ = 5) can save cooperation by creating a bi-stable dynamics: for initial
frequencies of cooperators above some threshold (x0 = 0.57, solid and dashed lines), cooperators thrive and
eventually reach fixation; whereas for initial frequencies below the threshold (x0 = 0.54, dash-dotted lines) the
conversion of poor patches remains too slow and cooperators disappear. In both cases, the dynamics result in a
clear positive linkage between cooperators and rich patches during the transient phase but gets eroded sooner for
smaller x0, which then results in the demise of cooperation. b for fast ecological changes (λ = 2, c.f. Fig. 4c), slow
degradation rates (ρ = 0.1) can prevent cooperation from taking over and resulting in coexistence of cooperators
and defectors, regardless of the initial configuration. Sometimes the dynamics exhibit damped oscillations as
shown here for large initial fractions of cooperators on few rich patches without linkage (x0 = 0.9, α0 = 0.1, and
ν0 = 0; solid and dashed lines) as well as strong linkage with initially many rich patches and few cooperators but
all on poor patches (x0 = 0.1, α0 = 0.9, and ν0 = 0.09; dash-dotted lines).
while xˆ is determined by the roots of
1
e
x (1− x)
ρ (1− x) + x
(
eλρ− (P− S− x (R− S− T + P))×(
x (xR + (1− x) S + e) + ρ (1− x) (xT + (1− x) P) +
λρ+ σ (ρ (1− x) + x)
))
= 0. (21)
Note that no singularities exist because the denominator in Eq. (21) is always positive. In addition to P0
and P1, up to three additional interior fixed points may exist but, unfortunately, finding them explicitly
involves solving cubic polynomials, which precludes further detailed analysis. However, just as for the
conservation game (see Appendix C), the stability conditions at P0 and P1 remain accessible: P0 is stable
for sufficiently slow ecological changes, namely λ < λc = −Sσ/ (S + e), while P1 is stable if the combined
ecological effects are sufficiently strong, namely λρ > − (T − R) (R + e + σ) / (T − R− e).
Second, the donation game satisfies the equal-gains-from-switching property, R − S = T − P, which
simplifies the dynamics:
x˙ = −x(1− x)c + eν; (22a)
α˙ = λ (x− αρ+ (ρ− 1) (αx + ν)) ; (22b)
ν˙ = λx (1− x + (ρ− 1) (α (1− x)− ν))
− ν (αe + λ+ σ+ x (b− c)) , (22c)
with equilibria νˆ = xˆ (1− xˆ) c/e and αˆ as before, Eq. (20a), and xˆ given by the roots of
1
e
x (1− x)
ρ (1− x) + x
(
(e− c) (λρ− xc)− c (ρ (1− x) + x) (σ+ xb)
)
= 0, (23)
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Figure 6. Dynamics of evolutionary games with ecological feedback as a function of the speed of ecological
changes, λ, and the relative rates of degradation of rich patches, ρ, by defectors as compared to restoration of
poor ones by cooperators. For small λ, defection, P0, is stable (above dashed line) while for large ρ, cooperation,
P1, is stable (below dash-dotted line). a The conservation game does not include interactions between individuals
but serves as a relevant reference. The dots indicate parameter combinations depicted in Figs. 4, 5 with e = 3,
c = 1, and σ = 1. For small λ and ρ, defection dominates and all patches are of poor quality (red). Increasing
ρ strengthens linkage between cooperators and rich patches and results in bistable dynamics with defection
and cooperation both stable (pink). Similarly, increasing λ further supports cooperation and leads to stable
coexistence (green) or even dominant cooperation (blue). b Asymmetric donation game with environmental
feedback for e = 2, b = 4, c = 1, and σ = 1 (c.f. Fig. 1 without feedback). The dynamical scenarios follow
the same patterns as for the conservation game in a but cooperation is slightly more challenging in that larger
ρ or λ are required. The only qualitative difference is a small region with two interior equilibria, which results
in bistability between stable coexistence and homogeneous cooperation (purple). c Asymmetric snowdrift game
with equal splits for b = 4, cr = 1, cp = 6, and σ = 2 (c.f. Fig. 2 without feedback). Sufficiently large λ
results in stable coexistence, independent of ρ. For smaller λ and large ρ, defection dominates because the
relentless restoration of poor patches becomes too costly. Decreasing ρ yields two interior fixed points and results
in bistability between homogeneous defection and stable coexistence (maroon). d Same as c but with fair splits
of costs. The qualitative dynamical scenarios remain essentially unchanged but fair splits provide some support
for cooperation by extending the region of bistability (maroon). Moreover, a small region of bistability between
homogeneous cooperator and defector states appears (pink, see inset).
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which, apart from the trivial equilibria, is reduced to a quadratic polynomial admitting at most two interior
equilibria. Nevertheless, the analytical expressions remain unwieldy for further analysis. A numerical
classification of the dynamics are shown in Fig. 6b. For sufficiently slow ecological changes, λ < λc =
cσ/(e− c), defection at P0 is stable. For slow degradation rates (small ρ), P0 is the only stable outcome, but
increasing ρ strengthens linkage between cooperators and rich patches and eventually results in bistable
dynamics, where the system ends up in P0 or P1 depending on the initial configuration. Faster ecological
changes, λ > λc, support cooperation and result in stable coexistence for slow degradation rates, small ρ,
and stable cooperation at P1 for λρ > c (b− c + e + σ) / (e− c) with a small region of bistability between
stable coexistence and P1, see Fig. 6b.
Third, for the donation game with equal restoration and degradation rates (ρ = 1) and minimal back-
ground fitness (σ = c), the dynamics admit at most a single interior equilibrium, Q = (xˆ, xˆ, xˆ (1− xˆ) c/e),
where xˆ = (λ (e/c− 1) + c) / (b− c + e). Interestingly, increasing benefits, b, tends to undermine co-
operation and favours defectors. P0 becomes unstable and cooperators can persist for sufficiently fast
ecological changes, λ > λc = c2/ (e− c), sufficiently large environmental benefits, e, or sufficiently
small costs of cooperation, c. Similarly, P1 is stable if the combined ecological effects exceed a thresh-
old, λρ > c (b− c + e + σ) / (e− c), which always holds for sufficiently small costs, c. Unfortunately, even
in this restrictive setup, the stability of Q remains analytically inaccessible.
In the asymmetric snowdrift game, Eqs. (10)-(12), ecological feedback does not affect the qualitative
dynamics and coexistence is stable provided b > cr, cp. Therefore, regardless of patch quality, it always
pays to adopt a strategy that is different from that of the opponent. This behavior changes if, for example,
the cost on poor patches exceeds the benefits, cp > b > cr, and effectively turns those interactions into
prisoner’s dilemmas. In that case, stable coexistence can be maintained only for sufficiently fast ecological
changes, λ > λc = −σ
(
b− cp
)
/ (b− cr), but regardless of degradation rates, ρ. For λ < λc defection
at P0 is stable, but slow degradation rates, ρ, introduce two interior fixed points and result in bistability
between P0 and coexistence; see Fig. 6c. This general pattern holds regardless of whether the work for
clearing the snowdrift is split equally or fairly. The latter case only extends the region of bistability; see
Fig. 6d.
4.2. Socio-environmental dilemmas. Up to this point, we tacitly assumed that cooperators care not only
about the well-being of their social partners but also care about and restore their environment. That
“cooperation” accurately describes such an action is unambiguous since both a co-player and the envi-
ronment would view it as such. We now turn to a more hypocritical (or at least more pragmatic) form of
cooperation in which cooperators exploit and degrade rich patches at rate λ and prevent the regeneration
of poor patches in order to provide benefits to others. Defectors, on the other hand, attempt to free ride
on benefits provided by others but do not extract environmental resources, which allows poor patches to
regenerate at rate ρλ. The resulting dynamics are governed by
x˙r = fCyr − fDxr − λxr; (24a)
x˙p = fCyp − fDxp + λxr; (24b)
y˙r = fDxr − fCyr + λρyp; (24c)
y˙p = fDxp − fCyp − λρyp, (24d)
which is similar to Eq. (16) except for the reversed ecological impacts. Thus, the analysis remains anal-
ogous to the previous scenario but analytical results remain equally inaccessible. The dynamics again
admit two trivial fixed points, P0 = (0, 1, 0) and P1 = (1, 0, 0), but now P0 refers to homogeneous states
of defectors on rich patches (αˆ = 1), whereas P1 indicates homogeneous cooperation on poor patches
(αˆ = 0). In addition, up to three interior equilibria may again exist. Instead of focusing on generic cases,
we discuss the effects of ecological feedback for a selection of relevant and illustrative types of interactions
through numerical investigations of the characteristic dynamics; see Fig. 7 (and Hauert [45] for interactive
tutorials).
The donation game with negative “costs” transforms the interaction into the harmony game, which
renders cooperation the dominant strategy and hence eliminates the social dilemma. Including additive
environmental benefits, e, does not change the outcome for positive feedback between cooperators and
rich patches, as in Eq. (16), and cooperation (on rich patches) remains stable. However, much richer
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Figure 7. Dynamics of evolutionary games with ecological feedback as a function of the speed of ecological
changes, λ, and the relative rates of regeneration of poor patches, ρ, occupied by defectors as compared to
degradation of rich ones through cooperators. For large λ, defection, P0, is stable (below dashed line), while for
small ρ, cooperation, P1, is stable (above dash-dotted line). a The harmony game with additive environmental
benefits for b = 4, c = −1, e = 2, and σ = 0 results in a striking counterpart to the dynamical patterns of the
donation game with positive impacts of cooperators on the environment, c.f. Fig. 6b. In fact, the dynamics
are essentially the opposite: where cooperation was stable (blue), defection is now stable (red), and stable
coexistence (green) is replaced by bistability (pink) and vice versa. Finally, a small region of bistability between
defection and coexistence (maroon) exists that exhibited bistability between cooperation and coexistence. b
Asymmetric snowdrift game with equal splits of the costs for b = 4, cr = 1, cp = 6, and σ = 2 (c.f. Fig. 2
without feedback). For fast ecological changes (large λ), the environment is unable to recover, and defectors
dominate regardless of the degradation rate, ρ. Conversely, small λ results in stable coexistence of cooperators
and defectors. Splitting the costs fairly produces the same qualitative dynamics (not shown). c Asymmetric
donation game where cooperators exploit their patch for br = bp = 4, cr = −1, cp = 1, and σ = 1. Cooperation
is dominant on rich patches but defection dominates on poor patches. For fast ecological changes, defectors
again dominate – with the exception of a small region of bistability between defection and coexistence (maroon),
which is possible due to faster regeneration rates (larger ρ). Cooperation is sustainable only for slow ecological
changes (small λ) and results in stable coexistence (green) or persistent oscillations through stable limit cycles
(cyan) for small ρ. d Same as c but in the limit of opportunistic cooperators that help only when there is no cost
to themselves, with br = 4, cr = −1, bp = 0.01, cp = 0, and σ = 0. Note that the dynamics for bp = 0 becomes
degenerate and hence the limit for small bp needs to be considered. As before, fast ecological changes cannot
sustain cooperation but now cooperators dominate for small λ.
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and more interesting dynamics unfold when introducing negative feedback between cooperators and rich
patches. In the present context, negative costs could represent benefits extracted from the environment.
Interestingly, for e > −c > 0, i.e. if defectors on rich patches are better off than cooperators on poor
ones, the resulting dynamics are essentially the opposite of those in the donation game with positive
costs and positive feedback, c.f. Fig. 6b and Fig. 7a. Apart from a small shift in terms of λ and ρ,
the qualitative dynamics of the two scenarios simply have the stability of all fixed points inverted. For
fast ecological changes, λ > λc = −c (e + σ) / (c + e), cooperators efficiently degrade the environment
and render homogeneous defection (on rich patches) stable at P0. However, slow regeneration rates,
λρ < −c (b− c + σ) / (c + e), increase linkage between cooperators and poor patches and render P1 stable
as well, resulting in bistability. For slow ecological changes, λ < λc, the environment is unable to recover,
and P1 is the sole stable outcome except for fast regeneration rates (large ρ), which increase linkage
between defectors and rich patches and hence promote stable coexistence.
Introducing negative feedback between cooperators and rich patches for the asymmetric snowdrift
game, Eqs. (10)-(12), with equal splits of the costs results in stable coexistence for slow ecological changes,
λ < λc = −σ (b− cr) /
(
b− cp
)
, but drives cooperators to extinction for fast changes, i.e. P0 is stable for
λ > λc; see Fig. 7b. As long as cp > 0, cooperation at P1 is never stable. The qualitative dynamics are
largely independent of the regeneration rate, ρ, and also remain essentially unaffected by equal or fair
splits of the costs.
Finally, we return to the asymmetric donation game Eq. (8) in which cooperators on rich patches provide
benefits, br, at a cost, cr < br, whereas on poor patches the benefit is bp and the cost is cp < bp. Moreover,
we assume cp > 0 > cr, i.e., cooperators exploit rich patches and provide benefits to their interaction
partners including a personal gain of −cr. This exploitation results in the degradation of rich patches.
Conversely, on poor patches, cooperation bears a net cost but still comes at the expense of the environment
in that the patch is unable to regenerate. The negative feedback between cooperators and rich patches
results in interesting dynamics; see Fig. 7c. For fast ecological changes, λ > λc = −σcr/cp, P0 is the
only stable fixed point and defectors dominate with the exception of a small region of bi-stability between
P0 and a stable mixture. Conversely, cooperation at P1 is never stable as long as cp > 0. Therefore,
cooperators and defectors coexist when λ < λc. For faster regeneration rates (larger ρ), the interior fixed
point Q marks stable coexistence, but for smaller ρ, Q also becomes unstable and gives rise to persistent
oscillations resulting from stable limit cycles.
The limit bp, cp → 0 models opportunistic cooperators that follow utilitarian principles and cooperate
only if occupying a rich patch, where their exploitation of the environment even provides personal benefits.
For positive background fitness, σ > 0, defection (on rich patches), P0, is never stable, while cooperation
(on poor patches), P1, is always neutrally stable (largest eigenvalue of zero). No interior fixed point exists
and eventually all trajectories converge to P1 and social interactions cease. An interesting twist arises
for σ = 0: now P0 is stable for sufficiently fast ecological changes, λ > −cr > 0, and neutrally stable
otherwise, while the stability of P1 remains neutral. Moreover, a line of fixed points, L, appears and
connects P0 with P1: xr = yp = 0 and xp = 1− yr. For λ > −cr all fixed points along L are stable but
for λ < −cr those with xp <
(
1+ cr/br −
√
(1− cr/br)2 − 4λ/br
)
/2, i.e. closer to P0, are unstable. All
equilibria reflect perfect segregation with all cooperators on poor patches and all defectors on rich ones.
In the end, no social interactions take place because opportunistic cooperators on poor patches are just as
passive as defectors on rich ones. The dynamics in this scenario are illustrated in Fig. 7d for small bp to
avoid the intricacies of the degenerate case. L is eliminated and either P0 or P1 is stable, depending on the
rate of ecological changes.
5. Discussion
In nature, asymmetric interactions are the norm rather than the exception, whereas for models in
evolutionary game theory the opposite holds. Even individuals of the same species tend to differ in
more ways than in just some strategic behaviour, and these differences inevitably result in asymmetries.
For example, individuals may differ in body size, strength or agility, experience different developmental
histories or availability and access to resources – all of which are likely to have some impact on the costs
and benefits experienced by each individual in interactions. In general, such differences can be attributed
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either to the genetic makeup of an individual or its environmental conditions. Interestingly, asymmetries
based on genetic (heritable) features can be easily dealt with by formally making the feature part of the
strategic type of an individual. More specifically, d strategies and n genetic traits translate into dn strategic
types, and their interaction is represented by a symmetric dn× dn payoff matrix [28], which provides ample
justification for the historical focus on symmetric interactions.
In contrast, here we emphasize heterogeneities in the environment of the population by considering
patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual. This setup (i) generates persistent asym-
metric interactions between individuals, (ii) explicitly models effects of patch quality, and (iii) introduces
feedback mechanisms between an individual’s strategy and the quality of its patch. As a result, we observe
rich eco-evolutionary dynamics solely based on ecological parameters given by the rate of degradation and
restoration of patch qualities as well as the overall rate of change as compared to evolutionary changes.
Indeed, fast ecological changes support cooperation in the asymmetric donation game with environmental
benefits provided that cooperators are sufficiently adept at restoring poor patches. In contrast, if coop-
erators exploit their environment in order to confer benefits to their co-players, fast ecological changes
may eliminate cooperation even in a harmony game, where cooperation is, in principle, the dominant and
mutually-preferred strategy.
The type of feedback between strategies and patch quality can even introduce different interpretations
of the nature of the traits themselves. While a cooperator may appear to act altruistically in social inter-
actions by conferring benefits to their co-players, this same cooperator may exploit the resources of its
patch and act as a cheater from the perspective of the environment. The tension between the socially ben-
eficial and the environmentally beneficial strategies renders this case particularly interesting and defies
classifications in terms of cooperators and defectors in the traditional sense.
This phenomenon is similar to but more striking than asymmetries in the snowdrift game where envi-
ronmental effects may alter the characteristics of the interaction such that some individuals are effectively
facing a stricter prisoner’s dilemma or a harmony game that eliminates the social dilemma. Again, the
interpretation of a seemingly-cooperative trait needs to be put into perspective with its environment.
While the asymmetric donation game is a straightforward extension of the symmetric donation game,
there is no canonical way to account for asymmetry in the snowdrift game. Here, we have considered two
biologically-reasonable versions of an asymmetric snowdrift game: one with equal splits and one with fair
splits of the work between two cooperators. For equal splits, each cooperator clears half of the snowdrift
(one at higher costs than the other), whereas for fair splits each bears the same costs (one clearing more
than half of the snowdrift). Equality and fairness coincide in the symmetric snowdrift game since the costs
for both players are the same.
For symmetric interactions, environmental feedback has recently been proposed [15] as a way to re-
solve the tragedy of the commons [47]. Their setup differs in that all individuals experience the same
environment and requires that the characteristics of interactions change based on the condition of the
environment. By construction, this model ensures that defection is dominant in rich environments, while
cooperation dominates in poor environments. Not surprisingly, then, this model supports co-existence
of cooperators and defectors in an intermediate environment or through cyclic dynamics. The impact of
eco-evolutionary feedback has also been reviewed in the context of toxic algal blooms [48], which reflects
ecosystem engineering on microbial scales with macroscopic consequences. At low densities of toxic al-
gae, the toxin may serve as a private good to deter predators or kill prey and hence selection favours toxin
production. Conversely, at high densities, the increased toxin concentration may turn the hunter into the
hunted and even invert trophic interactions if predators cannot tolerate high toxicity and become prey
themselves. This turns toxin production into a public good where all algae benefit from the absence of
predators or the provision of food resources. However, now selection acts against the costly production
of toxins, which can give rise to cyclic dynamics. Our model, specifically the asymmetric donation game
with negative environmental feedback, captures these dynamics, where rich (resp. poor) patches indi-
cate the presence (resp. absence) of predators, c.f. Fig. 7c. Cooperation represents the costly production
of toxins, which translates into immediate benefits in rich environments but results in net costs in poor
environments.
Feedback between an individual’s strategy and its environment introduces potential for linkage be-
tween strategic types and patch qualities. In the absence of feedback mechanisms, cooperators are doomed
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in prisoner’s dilemma interactions but sufficiently strong positive feedback between cooperators and rich
patches enables cooperators to persist or even take over the population. The emerging linkage represents
a form of assortment [49], only here cooperators do not offset their losses against defectors by more fre-
quently interacting with other cooperators but rather by more frequently enjoying the benefits provided
by rich patches.
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Appendix A. No environmental feedback
In the absence of environmental feedback, λ = 0, Eq. (B1) represents the transformed dynamics of
Eq. (5). Naturally, the fraction of rich patches, α, remains constant, α˙ = 0. Moreover, the linkage between
cooperators and rich patches declines over time because ν˙ ∝ −ν and eventually disappears, see Eq. (B1)c
with λ = 0. Thus, the long-term dynamics of the population are governed by Eq. (B1)a in the limit ν→ 0:
x˙ = x(1− x) [α(pi1 − pi3) + (1− α)(pi2 − pi4)] (A1)
with
pi1 = (x ·A)1 = xra11 + xpa12 + yra13 + ypa14; (A2a)
pi2 = (x ·A)2 = xra21 + xpa22 + yra23 + ypa24; (A2b)
pi3 = (x ·A)3 = xra31 + xpa32 + yra33 + ypa34; (A2c)
pi4 = (x ·A)4 = xra41 + xpa42 + yra43 + ypa44, (A2d)
where x = (xr, xp, yr, yp) denotes the state of the population and the matrix A =
[
aij
]
denotes the payoff
of an individual of type i against one of type j with i, j ∈ {Cr, Cp, Dr, Dp}. Note that Eq. (B1)a is inde-
pendent of σ and hence the population dynamics remain unaffected by the choice of background fitness.
Rearranging terms results in
x˙ = x (1− x) (S− P− x (R− S− T + P)) , (A3)
where R, S, T, and P denote the payoffs averaged across the different patch qualities, i.e.
R = α2a11 + α (1− α) (a12 + a21) + (1− α)2 a22; (A4a)
S = α2a13 + α (1− α) (a14 + a23) + (1− α)2 a24; (A4b)
T = α2a31 + α (1− α) (a32 + a41) + (1− α)2 a42; (A4c)
P = α2a33 + α (1− α) (a34 + a43) + (1− α)2 a44. (A4d)
Incidentally, Eq. (A3) is identical to the replicator equation for two types with payoff matrix
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (A5)
Thus, the equilibria and hence the long-term dynamics of the asymmetric interactions with four types are
identical to an averaged symmetric game between cooperators and defectors.
For asymmetric interactions captured by payoff matrices (3)-(4a) this yields
A =

Cr Cp Dr Dp
Cr R + e R + e S + e S + e
Cp R R S S
Dr T + e T + e P + e P + e
Dp T T P P
 =

R R S S
R R S S
T T P P
T T P P
+

e e e e
0 0 0 0
e e e e
0 0 0 0
 , (A6)
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and formally highlights that, in this scenario, environmental benefits of a rich patch amount to a simple
additive term to the fitness of its occupant. With σ > −min{R, S, T, P} the average fitness of cooperators
and defectors are
fC = x (σ+ S + x (R− S)) + xre; (A7a)
fD = (1− x) (σ+ P + x (T − P)) + yre, (A7b)
respectively. The long-term dynamics are determined by the average payoffs R¯ = R + αe, S¯ = S + αe,
T¯ = T + αe, and P¯ = P + αe. Hence, in the absence of feedback mechanisms, additive environmental
benefits merely result in a uniform shift of payoffs without changing the equilibria.
Appendix B. Transforming the dynamics
The dynamics of the four types with positive feedback between cooperators and rich patches, Eq. (16),
can be transformed using more intuitive and illustrative quantities given by the frequency of cooperators,
x = xr + xp, the frequency of rich patches, α = xr + yr and the linkage between cooperators and rich
patches, ν = xr − xα:
x˙ = x˙r + x˙p = (1− x) fC − x fD
= x(1−x) [α(pi1−pi3) + (1−α)(pi2−pi4)]
+ ν [(1−x)(pi1−pi2) + x(pi3−pi4)] ; (B1a)
α˙ = x˙r + y˙r = λ(xp − ρyr)
= λ(x− αρ+ (ρ− 1)(ν+ αx)); (B1b)
ν˙ = x˙r − αx˙− xα˙ =
= fCyr− fDxr+λxp − α ((1− x) fC−x fD)− xλ
(
xp−ρyr
)
= −ν[αpi3 + (1−α)pi4 − x(pi4−pi2)
+ (ν+ αx)(pi1−pi2−pi3+pi4) + λ+ σ
]
+ λx[(ρ− 1)(α(1− x)− ν) + 1− x]. (B1c)
For negative feedback between cooperators and rich patches, Eq. (24), the dynamics can be similarly
transformed:
x˙ = x(1−x) [α(pi1−pi3) + (1−α)(pi2−pi4)]
+ ν [(1−x)(pi1−pi2) + x(pi3−pi4)] ; (B2a)
α˙ = λ(ρ(1− x)− αρ+ (ρ− 1)(ν+ αx)); (B2b)
ν˙ = −ν[αpi3 + (1−α)pi4 − x(pi4−pi2)
+ (ν+ αx)(pi1−pi2−pi3+pi4) + λ+ σ
]
+ λx[(ρ− 1)(α(1− x)− ν)− ρ(1− x)]. (B2c)
Note that the evolutionary dynamics, Eq. (B2a), remains unchanged (c.f Eq. (B1a)) but naturally the eco-
logical dynamics and the linkage changes.
Appendix C. Conservation game
C.1. Stability analysis. For the stability analysis in the conservation game, the Jacobian matrix, J, is
J =
 (2x− 1) c 0 eλ (1+ α (ρ− 1)) λ (x (ρ− 1)− ρ) λ (ρ− 1)
λ
(
1+ν(ρ−1)
+(2x−1)(α(ρ−1)+1)
)
+ cν λx (1− x) (ρ− 1)− eν x (c− λ (ρ− 1))− σ− eα− λ
 . (C1)
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At the defector equilibrium, P0, the Jacobian, J, simplifies to
J =
−c 0 eλ −λρ λ (ρ− 1)
λ 0 −σ− λ
 , (C2)
with eigenvalues ξ0 = −λρ and ξ± = − 12
(
λ+ σ+ c±
√
(λ+ σ− c)2 + 4eλ
)
. All three eigenvalues
are always real and negative as long as (e− c) λ < cσ. Hence P0 is a stable node but turns into an
unstable node for small costs, c, large environmental benefits, e, or sufficiently fast ecological dynamics,
λ > λc = cσ/ (e− c).
Similarly, at the cooperator equilibrium, P1, the Jacobian, J, simplifies to
J =
 c 0 eλρ −λ λ (ρ− 1)
−λρ 0 −e + c− σ− λρ
 (C3)
with eigenvalues ξ0 = −λ and ξ± = − 12
(
λρ+ σ+ e− 2c±
√
(λρ+ σ+ e)2 − 4eλρ
)
. Hence, if the in-
equality (e + σ+ λρ)2 > 4λρe holds, then all eigenvalues are real and P1 is a stable node provided
λρ (e− c) > c (e− c + σ). Conversely, if (e + σ+ λρ)2 < 4λρe, then two eigenvalues are complex con-
jugates and P1 is a stable focus whenever e + σ− 2c + λρ < 0, which requires e < c because σ > c.
Unfortunately, at Q the Jacobian has an irreducible cubic characteristic polynomial, which essentially
renders any further analytical investigations unfeasible, except in special cases based on further simplify-
ing assumptions.
C.2. Degradation equals restoration, ρ = 1. For equal degradation and restoration rates, ρ = 1, the
interior fixed point is Q = (xˆ, xˆ, (1− xˆ) xˆc/e) with xˆ = λ/c− σ/ (e− c) and the Jacobian simplifies to
J=
 (2xˆ− 1) c 0 eλ −λ 0
λ (1− 2xˆ) + c2e (1− xˆ)xˆ −(1− xˆ)xˆc xˆ(c− e)− σ−λ
 . (C4)
In this case, it is possible to determine whether a Hopf bifurcation may occur, and hence check the
potential for stable limit cycles. One can do so by considering the characteristic polynomial for J in the
form ξ3 + pξ2 + qξ + r = 0, where the roots ξ represent the eigenvalues of J. If a Hopf bifurcation occurs,
then a parameter combination must exist such that one eigenvalue is real, ξ0, and the other two are
a purely imaginary complex conjugate pair, ±iξ1, which results in the factorization (ξ − ξ0)
(
ξ2 + ξ21
)
=
ξ3− ξ0ξ2 + ξ21ξ− ξ0ξ21 = 0. Hence, at this point, the polynomial coefficients need to satisfy p = −ξ0, q = ξ21
and r = −ξ0ξ21 or r = pq, thus
pq− r = e3 (e− c)3 c
[
e (e− c)4 λ3 + (e− c)2 c3
(
c2 + 2λ (e− c)
)
σ
+ (e− c) c3
(
3c2 + 2λ (e− c)
)
σ2 + 2c5σ3
]
. (C5)
For e > c, all terms on the right-hand-side are positive and hence the conditions for a Hopf bifurcation are
never met.
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